Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook 2021
Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook 2021

Photo: UHH/CLICCS
In the Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook, CLICCS researchers make the first systematic attempt to assess which climate futures are plausible, by synthesizing research from disciplines as varied as sociology, macroeconomics and earth system science. In this way, CLICCS helps to narrow down the multitude of future scenarios to inform policy and individual decisions.
Key FindingsClimate Protection: Deep Decarbonization by 2050 Currently not Plausible
CLICSS publishes a new, essential study on climate futures. The study represents the first systematic attempt to investigate whether a climate future with net-zero carbon emissions is not only possible but also plausible. The authors examine plausibility from a technical-economic perspective, but also with regard to the societal changes necessary for such a future. They conclude that deep decarbonization by 2050 is currently not plausible – the current efforts to bring about societal transformation need to be far more ambitious.
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Key Findings
Our key findings are:
- There are many possible futures of climate, but not all possible futures are also plausible. Because climate futures arise from a complex combination of social and physical dynamics, estimating their plausibility requires insights from multiple disciplines. The inaugural Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook makes the first systematic attempt to assess the plausibility of various climate futures. We deem climate futures to be plausible if we expect them to unfold with appreciable probability, given the existing evidence from the physical and social worlds.
- In this Outlook, we combine complementary assessments of physical and social dynamics, starting with a review of the techno-economic plausibility of very high and very low CO2 emissions scenarios. We find evidence from the scenario literature which suggests that very high emissions scenarios are internally inconsistent, due to the extent of economic damages from climate change, the falling cost of clean energy, and limits to recoverable coal reserves. The literature also provides some degree of evidence against the plausibility of large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal technologies, which is a common requirement of very low emissions scenarios.
- Very low emissions scenarios, if they are designed to achieve the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C target, additionally require decarbonization of the global economy by around the year 2050. Many known technical or economic options would in principle achieve this decarbonization goal in time. Yet existing assessments have only begun to evaluate the plausibility of the societal transformations necessary for deep decarbonization. Such a plausibility assessment requires the definition of the political, economic, and cultural conditions under which the necessary transformations become plausible. The existing empirical evidence can then be weighed against this theoretical model of transformation.
- We therefore propose the Social Plausibility Assessment Framework, a framework that enables the analysis of the social drivers of decarbonization, their enabling and constraining conditions, and emerging resources and structures that could influence plausible future developments of these drivers. None of the ten social drivers studied show sufficient movement toward deep decarbonization. Some of these drivers—namely United Nations climate governance, transnational initiatives, climate-related regulation, climate litigation, fossil fuel divestment, and knowledge production—support decarbonization, but without sufficient momentum to drive deep decarbonization by 2050. For two drivers—climate protests and social movements, and journalism—the momentum toward or away from deep decarbonization by 2050 could not be assessed. Two further drivers—consumption patterns and corporate responses—currently oppose decarbonization.
- Therefore, we find that unless the enabling conditions of social drivers deliver a radical boost to these drivers in the coming years, reaching worldwide deep decarbonization by 2050 is not plausible (see Figure 1). This result implies that, even if techno-economic options for decarbonization are theoretically available, reaching deep decarbonization by 2050 constitutes a societal challenge that may well be much larger than assumed by many.
- However, six of the evaluated social drivers show movement toward decarbonization, and many drivers offer resources that could be utilized by societal actors to strengthen the enabling conditions and therefore increase the plausibility of decarbonization in the future. Therefore, partial decarbonization by 2050 remains plausible under our current social assessment.
- The finding that deep decarbonization by 2050 is currently not plausible adds to the evidence speaking against the overall plausibility of very low emissions scenarios for the entire 21st century. Combined with the recently identified, narrower range of climate sensitivity, this indicates that limiting global surface warming below about 1.7°C by 2100 is currently not plausible.
- The new climate sensitivity range, combined with our techno-economic plausibility assessment, also constrains the upper bound of plausible warming, so that global surface warming above about 4.9°C by 2100 is likewise currently not plausible.
- This assessment of plausible futures represents a judgement that synthesizes currently available evidence. However, social agency can always produce departures from expected trajectories. For deep decarbonization by 2050 to become plausible, much will depend on public pressure via protests, organized action, and climate litigation, so that governments around the globe are increasingly driven towards policies that support change, not only via goals and pledges, but by consistent action. Furthermore, the complex interrelations within social dynamics can produce unforeseen disruptions, and events like the COVID-19 pandemic can happen at any time. Should additional evidence, including that from unexpected events, necessitate modifications of our assessment, this will be reflected in future editions of the Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook.
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Key Findings: the most importand findings at a glance (PDF, 2.7 MB)
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Publication
Stammer, Detlef; Anita Engels; Jochem Marotzke; Eduardo Gresse; Christopher Hedemann; Jan Petzold (eds.); 2021. Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook 2021. Assessing the plausibility of deep decarbonization by 2050. Cluster of Excellence Climate, Climatic Change, and Society (CLICCS). Hamburg, Germany.
- ePUB version of the publication (7 MB): Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook 2021: Assessing the plausibility of deep decarbonization by 2050
- PDF version of the publication (7 MB): Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook 2021: Assessing the plausibility of deep decarbonization by 2050
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Review copies can be ordered from Franziska Neigenfind.
Figures
The material below is the property of CLICCS/University of Hamburg and is protected by intellectual property laws. Please respect the copyright.
Plausibility of net global CO2 emissions by 2050. Download figure as jpeg file.

Figure 1: The speedometer shows the wide range of possible emissions in the year 2050 as described in existing emissions scenarios. Emissions could reach net-zero by 2050 (deep decarbonization) or could increase up to a doubling of current emissions (very high emissions). Approximate emissions in 2020 are indicated by the speedometer needle. Here we find a reduced range of plausible emissions scenarios, supported by a techno-economic plausibility assessment (Chapter 3) and a social plausibility assessment (Chapter 5), indicated by the shaded bands. Increasing emissions are not yet considered in the social plausibility assessment (gray band).
Components of the Social Plausibility Assessment Framework. Download figure as jpeg file.

Figure 2: The figure shows the chosen climate future scenario, deep decarbonization (right), and the selected key social drivers of deep decarbonization (left; see Chapters 5 and 8 for a description and analysis of the drivers). The assessment of the driver dynamic (center), their enabling and constraining conditions, and the potential global opportunity structure leads to a conjecture about the plausibility of the future scenario (Section 5.3).
The global opportunity structure. Download figure as jpeg file.

Figure 3: Social drivers (left) provide resources that become more material as they move from left to right in the figure. If the resources become visible to societal agents on a global level (center), these agents can use and combine them in material ways, which can influence driver-specific environments and therefore the enabling and constraining conditions of other drivers (right).
Projected 21st-century global surface warming. Download figure as jpeg file.

Figure 4: The 90% uncertainty ranges are indicated by shading around the central estimates (lines). Observed global surface warming is shown by the black line (Morice et al., 2021). The warming is simulated relative to the recent reference period 1995–2014 (left vertical axis). To convert to warming relative to the pre-industrial period, we note that the period 1995–2014 was observed to be warmer than the period 1850–1900 by 0.87°C (Morice et al., 2021; right vertical axis).
Detecting the effects of emissions reductions. Download figure as jpeg file.

Figure 5: Top figure shows atmospheric CO2 concentrations for two emissions scenarios, RCP2.6 and RCP4.5. Bottom figure shows an ensemble of 100 global surface warming responses to each concentration pathway (generated by the MPI-ESM Grand Ensemble; Maher et al., 2019). The ensemble mean warming is shown by the thick lines, individual simulations by thin lines. The bars describe the range of warming generated by each ensemble for the years 2040, 2060 and 2080.
Amplified regional internal variability. Download figure as jpeg file.

Figure 6: Simulations with the MPI Grand Ensemble are grouped according to when the global and decadal average surface temperature shows no warming (pre-industrial, pre-ind), or when it is warmer than the pre-industrial by either 1.5°C (blue) or 2°C (red). For each such decade, the figure shows how often the European annual summer temperature increase attains a certain value. The summer values are grouped in intervals of 0.075°C. Adapted from Suarez-Gutierrez et al. (2018).
Fact Sheets
Fact Sheets
- Key Findings (PDF, 2.7 MB)
- Frequently asked Questions (FAQ) (PDF, 0.6 MB)
Complementary Aspects
- The Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook and other assessments of climate futures (BOX I)
(Download as PDF, 3.2 MB)
- Synergies and trade-offs in the assessment of plausible climate futures (BOX II)
(Download as PDF, 3.2 MB)
- Diverse ways of knowing in a changing climate (BOX III)
(Download as PDF, 3.2 MB)
- COVID-19 and the changing climate (BOX IV)
(Download as PDF, 3.2 MB)
Authors
Aykut, Stefan (PART I: Chapter 3; 4; 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.1, 8.5)
Bassen, Alexander (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.7)
Beyer, Jürgen (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.7)
Brüggemann, Michael (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.9)
Busch, Timo (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.6, 8.7)
D`Amico, Emilie (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.1, 8.2)
Datchoua-Tirvaudey, Alvine (PART I: Box 3)
Engels, Anita (PART I: Chapter 1; 2; 4; 5; 7; PART II: Chapter 8.7, 8.8)
Frisch, Thomas (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.7)
Fröhle, Peter (PART I: Box 2)
Gresse, Eduardo (PART I: Chapter 1; 2; 4; 5; PART II: Chapter 8.8)
Guenther, Lars (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.9)
Hedemann, Christopher (PART I: Chapter 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6)
Held, Hermann (PART I: Chapter 3; 7)
Jarke-Neuert, Johannes (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.3, 8.4)
Johnson, Matthew (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.6)
Köhl, Michael (PART I: Box 2)
Lange, Andreas (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.2)
Li, Chao (PART I: Chapter 3)
Lüdemann, Jana (PART I: Box 3)
Marotzke, Jochem (PART I: Chapter 1; 2; 3; 6; 7)
Milinski, Sebastian (PART I: Chapter 6)
Neuburger, Martina (PART I: Box 3)
Nicolai, Maike (FAQ)
Notz, Dirk (PART I: Box 3)
Oßenbrügge, Jürgen (PART I: Box 2)
Pavenstädt, Christopher (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.4)
Perino, Grischa (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.3, 8.4)
Petzold, Jan (PART I: Chapter 1; 2; 3; 4; 5)
Ratter, Beate (PART I: Box 2)
Sander, Junis (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.8)
Scheffran, Jürgen (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.1, 8.2)
Schenuit, Felix (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.1, 8.3, 8.10)
Schnegg, Michael (PART I: Box 3)
Schneider, Uwe (PART I: Chapter 3)
Schmitt, Tobias (PART I: Box 3)
Singer, Katrin (PART I: Box 3)
Stammer, Detlef (PART I: Chapter 1; 2; 7)
Suarez-Gutierrez, Laura (PART I: Chapter 6)
Wickel, Martin (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.3, 8.5)
Wiener, Antje (PART I: Chapter 4; 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.5, 8.10)
Wilkens, Jan (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.4, 8.10)
Zengerling, Cathrin (PART I: Chapter 5.2; PART II: Chapter 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.5)
Reviewers
Enric Bas, Jörn Behrens, Leonie Färber, Gregory Flato, Pierre Friedlingstein,
Oliver Geden, Sue Grimmond, Jim Hall, Franziska Hanf, Peter Haugan, Gabriele Hegerl,
Charlotte Huch, Kerstin Jantke, Andreas Kannen, Franziska Müller, Heena Patel,
Simone Pulver, Ingrid van Putten, Simone Rödder, Heinke Schlünzen, Karl Steininger,
Anselm Vogler, Detlef van Vuuren
Citation
Stammer, Detlef; Anita Engels; Jochem Marotzke; Eduardo Gresse; Christopher Hedemann;
Jan Petzold (eds.); 2021. Hamburg Climate Futures Outlook 2021. Assessing the plausibility of deep
decarbonization by 2050. Cluster of Excellence Climate, Climatic Change, and Society (CLICCS). Hamburg, Germany.